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André Laliberté
Buddhist Charities and China’s Social Policy
An Opportunity for Alternate Civility?
Introduction 1
The development of religious institutions in China is one of the most remark-
able trends of the last twenty years. Among the many issues it raises for the
future of China, an important one is the effect of religious institutions’ growth
on politics. Few subscribe nowadays to the view that religion will vanish as
science delivers on its promises of a better tomorrow. Among those who believe
that religion can remain a relevant influence in politics, one can distinguish two
broad perspectives. On the one hand, some apply de Tocqueville’s view that
religious diversity positively affects democracy. On the other hand, the argument
that religion is an “opiate for the masses” sees religions’ revival or endurance
in authoritarian countries like China as a trend that is compatible with the resil-
ience of that regime. That view holds that religious beliefs distract people from
their mundane suffering with promises of salvation and therefore sap the will
of people to challenge the political structures responsible for their situation. The
Tocquevillian view has received support from analysts who have looked at the
relationship between religious vitality and transition to democracy in Taiwan
(Madsen, 2007; Kuo, 2008), and it is also receiving validation from sociologists
who, moreover, posit more specifically a link between Christianity and liberal
values in China (Yang, 2005). The opposite view of religion as alienation was
upheld under Chairman Mao as the Chinese government’s orthodoxy to justify
its policies against religion, but Chinese authorities during the mandate of Jiang
Zemin have upheld the same view, this time as a rationale for a more positive
appreciation of religion and its role in strengthening a stable society. It is an
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irony lost on no-one that a nominally atheist state should now use religion in
its governmentality. The behavior of Christians in China seems, partly, to vindi-
cate the Tocquevillian perspective on the impact of religion on the politics of
democratization. But this question remains open for Chinese Buddhism, which
has received less attention than Christianity, or even Tibetan Buddhism.
This essay invites us to question the Tocquevillian notion that religious insti-
tutions can act as a source of authority helping the development of democracies,
and even opens the possibility that it can induce the opposite by strengthening
an authoritarian regime’s resilience. To be sure, the argument made by Robert
Weller that forms of association between the family and the state, which he
termed an “alternate civility”, have provided a basis for Taiwan’s democratiza-
tion, is compelling, and that is also the case with his speculation about a compa-
rable kind of evolution in China (2001). The large lay Buddhist associations,
such as the Tzu Chi Merit Society ( ), the Buddha Light International
Association ( ), and the Dharma Drum Mountain ( ), that have
developed into important providers of social services in health care, education,
poverty alleviation, and disaster relief, rank as some of the most visible expres-
sions of this alternate civility in Taiwan (Huang 2009; Chandler 2004; Jones
1999). The relationship between the development of these associations and
democratization, however, may have been exaggerated. In the case of Taiwan,
these organizations were lukewarm in their support of democracy during the
period of martial law, although some of them have been participants in the
process of democratic consolidation (Laliberté, 2005). The recent expansion of
Taiwanese Buddhist associations in China, and the emergence of local associa-
tions throughout China that want to emulate them, warrants an exploration of
the potential for civility they can deploy there. Buddhist associations in China,
for understandable reasons because of their recent history of persecution during
the Cultural Revolution, have adopted the same attitude as Taiwanese asso-
ciations during martial law, and like other organizations approved by the
Communist Party, they do not get involved in the calls for political reforms. The
argument made here is that they prefer a non-oppositional path to politics, and
prefer to reinforce their legitimacy by helping the poor. This leaves open the
question of whether or not, in doing so, they lend support to the regime. One
thing is clear: Buddhist activities closely follow the directives of the state’s
social policies.
To understand the extent to which this is the case, the goal of this paper is
to set the context of China’s social policies and describe the ways in which
Buddhist charities get involved to help the state. What we observe in China unfolds
in a global context of state retrenchment from social policy, in which relations
between the state and religious institutions are becoming more complementary.
This follows a century-long period in which the modern state authority over reli-
gious institutions all over the world has been ascendant. For countries like China,
Buddhist Charities and China’s Social Policy - 97
where state authorities remain insecure about their legitimacy and control, and
religious institutions are facing a remarkable revival, state retrenchment from
social policy poses formidable challenges. Such governments are considering
relying on the human capital, financial resources and foreign contacts of religious
institutions to help them address issues in social policy for which they seek
support, while ensuring that such reliance does not generate a political capital
that could represent a potential challenge to their authority. In the case of China,
the confrontation between the state and the Falungong, a spiritual movement
claiming to offer an alternative to public health care, illustrates both the potential
and the risks of out-sourcing social services to religious institutions at a time
when the costs of health were becoming too prohibitive for many in that country
(Ownby 2010; Palmer 2007). The argument presented in this essay is that the
Chinese state seems confident that it does not incur such risks by letting Buddhist
institutions deliver social services.
Religion and Social Policies in a Comparative Perspective
Social policies include three broad domains of public intervention, which
altogether represent the largest component of developed states’ budgets: educa-
tion, health, and social security. Religious institutions have been involved with
these policies in the not-so-distant past of the West to a far greater extent than
today, and remain involved in these policies for many developing countries.
Although China does not qualify as a “developed economy” according to the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), more than
half of its budget is devoted to these three areas of spending. But even if Chinese
leaders consider their country to be a developing economy, until recently they
afforded religious institutions a far more limited role in public affairs than other
developing countries were willing to do. Before modern states were established,
religious institutions often ran services in education and health care as well as
relief to the poor, albeit not always in a comprehensive manner, as described by
Liang Qizi (1997) in her work on charities during the Ming-Qing transition. In
undertaking these activities, they were often in a position to maintain their own
authority alongside – if not against – secular political rulers. Conflicts between
religious institutions and states emerged when the latter sought to expand their
control and took up increasing responsibilities for education and health, thereby
directly challenging the source of religious institutions’ influence (Manow, 2004;
Wilcox, 1997).
Education today still remains an area of potential conflict between state and
religious authorities when their respective views on morality, the meaning of
life, obligations and duties do not converge (Manow and Palier, 2009). In China,
the state and religious institutions have clashed over education for two main
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reasons. An important issue of contention was the availability of resources to
deliver education, but ideology itself was also at stake, as explain Ji Zhe and
the contributors to a special issue on the subject in the journal Extrême-Orient
Extrême-Occident (2011). Hence, when the republican and the socialist regimes
in China sought to spread education to the population, they decided to harness
the material resources of religious institutions to meet their objectives, seizing
their land and property in an attempt to turn temples into schools (Goossaert
and Palmer, 2010; Ashiwa, 2009: 52-55; Nedostup, 2009; Goossaert, 2006;
Duara, 1991).
Public health, and in particular reproductive health, women and children’s
welfare, elderly care, and long term care, is another domain of public policy
where the ideals of religious leaders and their followers can clash with those of
the state’s civil servants. Religious teachings and the political ideals of moderniz-
ers harbor specific moral views about family, gender relations, sexual orienta-
tion, and dignity that can be difficult to reconcile even when they include ethical
principles such as justice, equality, and universality (Kahl, 2009).
Finally, Social security, including social insurances and poverty alleviation
measures, represents another potential source of contention for religious associa-
tions. This time, however, the state is more likely to be criticized for not doing
enough. When the state fails to provide social security, it can set the stage for
the kind of unrest that is detrimental to political stability and therefore the
development of religious institutions that thrive on the latter (Quadagno and
Rohlinger, 2009). Religious institutions, in that case, are more likely to demand
state intervention than reject it, unless tax extraction affects them too much.
Comparative analyses of social policies in developed countries (Esping-
Andersen, 1990), or the transition economies in Latin America, Eastern Europe,
and East Asia (Haggard and Kaufman, 2008) emphasize many explanatory fac-
tors for the development of these policies but the impact of religious institutions
represents a blind spot. This shortcoming in our knowledge is a major problem
in our understanding of the challenges that states face when they try to design,
expand, or reform their social policies. Since the nineteenth century, religious
institutions have fought bitterly to oppose the expansion of the state’s responsi-
bilities in social policies. For example, in France throughout the late 19th century
up until the beginning of the 20th century, the Catholic Church and the state
have fought for control over education (Lanfrey, 2003). In other cases, religious
institutions supported the expansion of the state’s social policy. Hence, the Catholic
Church under Bismarck favored the implementation of social insurances, in the
hope of countering the influence of communist parties over the labor movement
(Dickinson, 1996). In all these cases, these battles between religions and the state
were part of a broader process of democratization.
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Studies on the states’ attempt to use temples to serve its own social programs
in education and health care during the late Qing dynasty and the early Republi-
can period reveals important differences between China and the situation experi-
enced in the West that remain relevant today (Goossaert and Palmer, 2010;
Nedostup, 2009; Goossaert, 2006; Duara, 1991). While the state tried to estab-
lish its authority in China in the early twentieth century, it did not have to deal
with a single unified institution like the Catholic Church. It faced instead a
number of local associations, of varied levels of capacity and resources. In that
context, apart from conflicts between the Nationalist Party (KMT) and Christian
schools (Lutz, 1988), the state encountered little opposition from religious insti-
tutions in the development of a modern state’s key institutions in the realm of
public health and relief to the poor. Buddhist institutions, Christian missionaries,
and redemptive societies as well had established orphanages, schools, and clinics,
but the unsettled political situation during the whole period made it difficult for
them to nurture a unified and effective leadership that could articulate, let alone
defend, a corporate position on issues of public interest such as poverty allevia-
tion. This became even more difficult during the first two decades of the People’s
Republic. Then, the state sought actively to prevent any religious institution
from getting organized and provided through the People’s Communes and State-
Owned Enterprises a comprehensive array of social services. In other words,
any analysis of Buddhist institutions’ weak institutions today must keep that
in perspective.
With the reform policy adopted after 1978, the requirements that People’s
Communes and State-Owned-Enterprises act as sole provider of social services
have been jettisoned. This major change did not mean a similarly radical shift
with respect to state-religion relations because China does not have a public
sphere comparable to post-industrial democracies where religious institutions can
advance their own corporate interests. Besides the formal aspect of state control
of religion, however, the context of changing social policies provides to a number
of religious actors opportunities to assert themselves as institutional actors.
Although their influence in policy debates remains unexplored and difficult to
assess, their potential for the delivery of social services, and therefore to become
important stakeholders, is growing in importance. As Ji Zhe has written, it is a
remarkable paradox that the efforts of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to
control religious institutions has provided them with a cohesiveness that was
lacking in the Republican period and that had made them vulnerable at the time
(2008: 257).
The findings discussed below on relations between state and religion in China
and their impact on social policies seeks to address shortcomings on this relation
by recent literature on the welfare state which has expended beyond the confines
of Western Europe, the Anglo-Saxon democracies of the New World, and Japan
(Haggard and Kaufman, 2008). The same blind spot is found in the work by
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Ian Gough and Geoff Wood on the issue of welfare regimes in developing coun-
tries, which addresses in particular the role of informality and welfare mix in
the social policies of states that refuse to follow the way of Western European
states, with their more generous welfare outcomes (2004). They have examined
an even greater and more diversified number of societies than Haggard and
Kaufman did and their emphasis on informality brings attention to the role of
religions at the basic level. The societies studied by Gough and Wood have seen
a resilience of religiosity that compelled many to look anew at the effect of religion
on the welfare state. However, their discussion on social policy in Asia offers
very little on the role of religion. This reflects the scholarship on the role of
religion in East Asian social policies, which sometimes refer to a Confucian welfare
model and emphasize the role of family, but seldom pays attention to religious
institutions (Walker and Wong, 2005; Gough, 2004; White, Goodman, and
Kwon, 1998). This neglect is all the more baffling considering the importance
of religion in the politics of the region, a reality that has been observed in studies
of transition to democracy in Asia (Cheng and Brown, 2005).
The remnant of the article will look at the involvement of Buddhist philan-
thropic associations in the provision of social services to help the government
offset the inequalities within China. This is not to say that Buddhist associations
are substitutes to the state or to the few cases of corporate responsibility. Bud-
dhists are still rebuilding their institutions after decades of persecution or neglect,
and they are busy training a new generation of monks and nuns. Many temples
visited in the course of the field work leading to the writing of this article looked
in serious state of disrepair and in financial difficulty. But other temples, such
as the Jing’an Temple ( ) in Shanghai or Nanputuo Temple ( ) in
Fujian, are much wealthier. Some of them, such as Bailin Temple ( ) in
Hebei, Yufo Temple ( ) in Shanghai, and Nanputuo, are sponsoring or
directly offering social services in a more conspicuous way than ever before since
1949. They do so in the three broad domains of social policies which were
hitherto seen as a primary responsibility of the modern state in China: health
care, education, and relief. As discussed before, these social policy areas have
represented historically arenas of contention between state and religious institu-
tions. But these domains of social policies can also constitute area where states
and religious institutions cooperate and complement each other, when religious
institutions act as substitute to compensate for the state’s lack of capacity in
financial or human resources.
The next section will consider Buddhist institutions as an emerging and grow-
ing source of support to the state in the implementation of its social policies.
Although this discussion will be limited to Buddhism, it is clear that other institu-
tionalized religions such as Daoism, the various Christian denominations, and
Islam, as well as local temples cults, lineages, and devotional groups, are also
active in providing social services in a significant way. However, while Islam
and Christianity are active in charity and the provision of social services in
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societies where their adherents represent a majority of the population, Buddhist
and Taoist associations may be able to reach out to a greater proportion of the
Chinese population, as they can be the institutional expression of traditional
religions for a greater number of Chinese. Among these two latter traditions,
Buddhist associations have demonstrated in Taiwan, the closest society to China
culturally speaking, their ability to deliver social services in health care, educa-
tion, and disaster relief.
The Expansion of Buddhist Philanthropy in China
The data presented in this article results from field research undertaken
between 2004 and 2011 in 25 different cities located in nine different provinces 2
and three of the province-level municipalities. 3 I am using for this article a
variety of sources accumulated during these visits: they are publications pro-
duced by temple management committees, local Buddhist official associations,
lay devotees group and local charity associations. 4 The interviewees were monks
and lay Buddhist devotees, and when possible officials from the local Buddhist
associations, bureaus for religious affairs, and state-sponsored charities. 5 Chinese
scholars have recommended some of the locations, such as the Bailin temple in
Hebei, the Nanputuo temple in Xiamen, and the Yufo temple in Shanghai,
because they have developed more than others their philanthropic activities.
Others, such as the Tianijn Buddhism Charity Beneficence Fund (sic!) (Tianjin
fojiao cishan gongde jijinhui ) and the Chinese Medicine
Charitable Clinic of the Guangdong Province Buddhist Association (Guangdong
sheng fojiao xiehui cishan zhongyi zhensuo ), have
successfully advertised their activities online, but they are not as well known
by colleagues and fellow Buddhists met during interviews. Prior to that field
research and in conjunction with visits onsite, online searches for the location
of Buddhist philanthropic institutions throughout the country since 2003 have
revealed wide discrepancy in the development of their activities across different
regions, but no systematic correlation between the extent of Buddhist charities’
presence and the socio-economic status of the regions where they occur. For
example, while Buddhist charity is very active in the special municipalities of
Shanghai and Tianjin, it is less so in Beijing. It is present in coastal cities with
a long history of relations with outside world such as Xiamen, but it also thrives
in locations in the interior, such as Henan province.
2. Hubei, Hebei, Anhui, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Guangdong, Fujian, Henan, and Shanxi.
3. Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin.
4. The resources of reading rooms attached to the Yufo temple in Shanghai, the Bailin
temple in Hebei, and the Foxueyuan in Guangzhou have been especially helpful in providing
access to a large number of periodicals, brochures and documents produced by many locations
I had not had the opportunity to visit.
5. The Buddhist monks were usually referred to me by Chinese scholars.
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This article focuses on Buddhism because this is one of the five officially
recognized religions of China, and the largest of them in the number of followers
according to state authorities. The number of people who self-identify as “Bud-
dhists” and the estimates social scientists or census-takers register, however,
remains difficult to ascertain. The government claims that there are “100 mil-
lion” Buddhists, but these figures are only suggestive and not taken seriously.
Moreover, there are different strands in the world of Han Chinese Buddhism:
alongside the official associations sponsored by the state, there are many associa-
tions with divergent interests and visions. Lay Buddhist groups (jushilin ),
religious entrepreneurs, charity associations, and societies for Buddhist studies
thrive outside of the official local Buddhist associations (Sun Yanfei, 2012). This
article will set aside the important questions of adherent numbers and authen-
ticity of Buddhist belief and practice and focus on the institutional expression
of Buddhism and the involvement of Buddhist registered associations in social
policy. Although this portrait cannot claim to represent all of Buddhism’s reality
in China, it offers a very instructive look at one aspect of the state’s religious
policy, in which the relationship between one religion and the state is mutually
constitutive, or as Ashiwa and Wank wrote, the making of modern religion
relates to the making of the modern state (Ashiwa and Wank, 2009: 7).
There is little doubt that Buddhism has experienced an extraordinary growth
in the last two decades. By 2004, the National Bureau of Statistics’ database
on religion in China noted that close to half of the new Buddhist temples and
associations it has registered had been established after 1992 (see table 1). It
remains difficult to interpret properly this expansion, however: it could mean a
surge in the number of Buddhist believers and the construction of new temples
and monasteries as a response to an increasing demand, or it could simply repre-
sent an effort to rebuild temples and monasteries that have been destroyed or
neglected in previous periods of history. There is no doubt that this state-sponsored
rehabilitation of Buddhism as a legitimate component of Chinese society is not
a full restoration to its previous status as an important institution. When we put
this growth in a broader historical perspective it is clear that Buddhism is far
from reaching the influence it once held in China. Hence, Holmes Welch’s land-
mark study of Buddhism between 1900 and1950 quoted surveys of the Republican
government that counted more than 256,000 temples and monasteries with monks,
nuns, or laymen and laywomen in residence within China’s provinces between
1937 and 1945 (Welch 1967: 419). This number represents more than three
times the number of all religious associations currently registered in 2004 by
the Statistics’ bureau. As Ashiwa (2009: 55) and Welch (1968) both noted,
Buddhism had suffered a series of setbacks since the Taiping Rebellion. They
also endured persecution during the modernizing campaigns to turn temples into
schools during the Late Qing and the early Republican era (Ashiwa, 2009: 49-
55; Duara, 1991; Welch 1968). Although the religion went through a modern
reform movement with the monk Taixu (Pittman, 2001), it was constrained by
conditions prevailing under the periods of warlordism, the Japanese invasion,
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and the Civil War. In other words, the travails experienced by Buddhism during
the Cultural Revolution represented the nadir in a long period of persecution
from modernizers, warlords, and religious leaders that extended far beyond the
era when China was under the leadership of Mao Zedong. In short, the current
Buddhist revival remains rather modest when set in the perspective of China’s
longue durée.
Table 1: Buddhist institutions 6 in China, by year of founding
Total Before 1949 1949-1966 1967-1977 1978-1991 After 1992
1,433 624 335 3,265 5,59311,250 (12.7%) (5.5%) (3.0%) (29.0%) (49.7%)
Source: CNBS, Atlas of religion, 2004.
With these qualifications about the expansion of Buddhism in mind, it is
clear that the situation of temples and Buddhist institutions, like religion in gen-
eral, has improved dramatically after Deng Xiaoping repudiated most of Mao’s
policies on religious affairs. The number of new Buddhist temples and associa-
tions increased in the 1980s during the reformist administrations of Hu Yaobang
and Zhao Ziyang. This coincided with efforts to lure Taiwanese, Hong Kong
and overseas Chinese’s investments in China. This relative acceptance initially
did not mean greater openness for Buddhist institutions, which remained sub-
jected to regulations that forbade any non-liturgical activities within temple and
no activities whatsoever outside of temples. The early wave of temple and monas-
teries’ construction in the 1980s went through a sharp drop in the year that
followed the June 4th massacre, but it experienced a swift revival following Deng
Xiaoping’s Southern tour in 1992 (see Figure 1). In 1996, 659 Buddhist temples
and associations were built or established in that year alone, an unprecedented
peak that would not be repeated until 2004, which is the last year for which
official data covering the entire country are available. It is not clear yet if the
decline in growth experienced after 1996 indicates a consolidation of established
temples and institutions, or a more ominous trend of limiting the expansion of
the religion. As will be discussed below, however, the diminishing rate of new
constructions from 1996 to 2004 contrasts with the continuing growth in the
charitable activities performed by Buddhists institutions in the same period and
after.
6. The category “associations” is very inclusive: a close look at the data for Shanghai
compiled for the Atlas of Religion reveals that the survey lists local Buddhist associations (fojiao
xiehui ), stricto sensu, as well as lay devotee lodges (jushilin ), monasteries (cha-
nyuan ), nunneries (an ), Buddhist institutes (foxueyuan ), temples (si or miao ),
and even, in one case, a shop to sell candles, which was connected to a Buddhist temple. As
the survey mentioned by Welch suggests, however, the figure for the number of temples before
1949 is not reliable.
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Source: ACMRC, 2010.
Figure 1. Buddhist Association by year of founding
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This expansion has received state support, which can be ascertained by the
approval of an increasing number of Buddhist associations whose purpose is to
either raise money for charity or offer social services (See Table 2). Foundations
(jijinhui ) represent the first type of associations. Not all provincial associa-
tions have established one, and the initiative comes sometimes from individual
temples and move upward from there. The earliest two foundations were estab-
lished in 1994 by the Nanputuo Temple, in the city of Xiamen in Fujian province,
and in Guangdong province by the local Buddhist association. The proximity of
Taiwan to Xiamen, where Buddhist charity is active, and even more of Hong
Kong to Guangdong, is probably not mere happenstance. These two major sources
of investment to China made the location of these two foundations in Xiamen
and Guangdong natural. Other provincial Buddhist associations have followed
suit in establishing foundations, but not all of them benefitted from such neigh-
bourhood nor were similarly well-endowed economically. With the exception of
Fujian and Guangdong provinces and the province-level municipality of Tianjin,
all the other provinces in which foundations were established are poor or middle-
income. These initiatives had the support of provincial governments and provin-
cial committee party leaders, but it is only fourteen years after the founding
of the Guangdong Foundation that the Chinese Buddhist Association set up a
foundation at the national level to raise funds, which suggests a bottom-up process.
Merit societies (gongdehui ) represent the second type of institutions
established by Buddhist provincial or local associations. These institutions
are meant specifically to provide social services. The pioneer in that regard is
the Hebei Buddhist Charity Merit Society (Hebei fojiao cishan gongdehui
), which was an offshoot of the Bailin Temple in Shijiazhuang
prefecture. As the study by Yang and Wei made clear, the growth of that temple
was facilitated by good connections with the government (Ji, 2007; Yang and
Wei, 2005).
Interviews conducted between 2004 and 2011 have confirmed the impor-
tance of obtaining support from local governments for the ability of Buddhist
associations to establish charity institutions that could legally perform social
services. But these observations have also revealed considerable variance in the
extent and the modus operandi of that cooperation. In Guangdong, for example,
a cadre of the provincial bureau for religious affairs interviewed about a local
Buddhist clinic offering traditional Chinese medicine in Guangzhou expressed
its full support for this activity and disclosed up to ten such clinics have been
authorized in the province. 7 The local officials approved the existence of such
clinics even though the legal framework for the provision of health care at the
national level was then, and remains at the time of writing, unclear about the
7. Interview in Guangzhou with the Vice-Director of the Provincial Bureau for Religious
Affairs, June 2010.
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legal status of such activities. This official leniency could surprise us, considering
the alarm with which the government had seen the claim by Falungong followers
that the practice of breathing exercises could be a substitute to the public health
care system. But the support of the Guangdong provincial government to a
Buddhist association providing some medical services, it turned out, was meant
to be temporary, and therefore, did not threaten to become a too attractive
alternative to the existing health care system. The clinics’ activities were under
close official watch, as the interview with the provincial official was conducted
in the clinic itself. As one employee of that clinic further explained, after the
government offered more generous health insurance (yibao ) and support
for pensioners (tuixiu ), visits to the clinic had diminished significantly, and
therefore its potential as an alternative to the existing institutions was unlikely.
While support for the Guangdong Buddhist Clinic suggested cautious support
to a small operation, authorities in Tianjin appeared much bolder. The municipal
government threw its support behind a much more ambitious organization, the
Buddhism Charity Beneficence Fund mentioned before. This was clear in a
recorded document about its founding in 2005 (TBCBF 2005), and in 2009
when the Tianijn Religious Affairs Bureau’s Vice-Chair reiterated its support
and endorsed its activities. 8 The Fund, under the leadership of the Jianfu
Guanyin ( ) Temple’s Abbess Miao Xian ( ) became well-known after
it raised funds with the public through its affiliated temples in that major city
for the victims of the 2008 Wenchuan quake in Sichuan. More recently, follow-
ing requests by the municipal charity association (shi cishan zonghui )
made through the municipal Bureau for Religious and Ethnic Affairs in 2010,
it launched another fund-raising campaign in Nankai University for a program
to help students (zhuxue xiangmu ) in poor area, remote regions, and
ethnic minority communities. The Fund’s brochure promised that it could offer
a surprisingly large array of services: poverty alleviation (fupin zhukun ),
donations for students in difficulty (juanzi zhuxue ), free medical treat-
ment and medicine gift (shiyi shiyao ), and special funds for disaster relief
(jiuzai zhuankuan ). The Fund also hopes to help people with disabilities
(zhucan ) and to get involved in environmental protection (huanbao ),
and both objectives are endorsed by the local Bureau for Religious and Ethnic
Affairs (TBCBF 2005). A visit in the associations’ headquarters in 2011 has
revealed a very small but committed team of lay Buddhists, and as was the case
with the clinic observed a year before in Guangdong, with a limited scope. In
short, the Fund appears unlikely to alarm the authorities.
Not all provinces have registered Buddhist philanthropic associations. Poorer
provinces have, arguably, less resource available, and they are more likely to
8. See “Wo shi zhaokai fojiao cishan gongde jijinhui huanjie jidi’erjie lishi huiyi
(Our municipal Buddhist charity’s second assembly
re-elect its leadership’)” at the following URL http://www.tjmw.gov.cn/xwzx/html/559.shtml
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be recipients of services provided through Buddhist charities established in the
wealthier provinces. The situation of Shanxi embodies this situation. Although
Wutaishan, one of the four sacred Buddhist mountains (sida mingshan ),
is located in that province, and despite the fact that Buddhists in Shanxi had
long hoped to establish a provincial Buddhist philanthropic association similar
to the one in neighboring Hebei, its establishment has proven very difficult. A
monk holding responsibilities with the local Buddhist association in Taiyuan’s
White Cloud Temple shed some lights on the difficulties Buddhists face in poorer
provinces. Echoing comments by monks and nuns heard in other temples I had
visited in Hubei and Anhui in previous years, he blamed the complexity of the
registration process, the characteristic of the local environment and the CCP’s
own record of relations with religions. 9 The situation of Shanxi is not the excep-
tion: a majority of China’s provinces and special municipalities do not have a
province-wide Buddhist charity association at the time of writing (see table 2).
On the other hand, some Buddhist charities have not waited for government
intervention to set up operations. The Charity Foundation established by the
Nanputuo temple mentioned above, for example, was created following the initi-
ative of then Abbott Miao Zhan, in 1994. As the Deputy Director of the Founda-
tion’s management office explained, the foundation has no relations with the
government. Its establishment resulted from the initiative of local monks, who
had registered it as a non-governmental organization. Municipal authorities in
Xiamen had accepted the creation of the charity, but the local government-
supported charity association, however, does not cooperate with it and its publi-
cation ignores it altogether. This suggests that even when the philanthropic activ-
ities of local Buddhist associations are approved or at least tolerated, it does not
follow that they receive unanimous approval from the state bureaucracy. This
mixture of state approval, on the one hand, and non-recognition, on the other,
is frequent. Employees of local state-sponsored charities affiliated to the China
Charity Foundation met in Shanghai and Nanjing, for example, were unaware
of the activities of Buddhist charities in the area under their jurisdiction, even
while the Jade Buddha temple in Shanghai and the Qixia temple in Nanjing
sponsored such activities. 10 Although the philanthropic activities of Buddhist
charities are approved by the CCP United front departments and advertised in
the publications of the state administrations for religious affairs and the Buddhist
associations, they are generally ignored and overlooked by the official documents
of the official charities associations established by the administrations for civil
affairs. Efforts to cross-check the existing activities of Buddhist charities with
mentions in the local gazeeters (difang nianjian ), usually yield no mention
of them. In other words, good relations with government help set up Buddhist
philanthropic activities, but it does not mean unanimous support.
9. Interview with a monk in White Cloud Temple, Taiyuan, July 2010.
10. Interviews in the summer of 2010 in Shanghai and Nanjing.
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Table 2: Provincial Buddhist associations and related charities or foundations
Creation dates
Provinces Name of Foundations
Assoc. Found.
China 1956 2008 China Buddhist Charity Foundation
Anhui 1980 2000 Anhui Zhao Puchu Public Interest
Foundation
Beijijng 1981 – –
Chongqing 1998 1998 Chongqing Buddhist Charity Merit Society
Fujian 1962 1994 Nanputuo temple Charity Foundation
Gansu 1959 ? Gansu Buddhist Charitable Foundation
Guangdong 1982 1994 Guangdong Buddhist Charitable Foundation
Guangxi 1993 2010 Guangxi Buddhist Charitable Foundation
Guizhou 1988 – –
Hainan 1999 ? Hainan Buddhist Charitable Foundation
Hebei 1988 1995 Hebei Buddhist Charity Merit Society
Heilongjiang 1984 2005 Heilongjiang Daqing Charitable Society
Henan 1983 – –
Hubei 1959 ? Hubei Buddhist Charity Merit Society
Hunan 1985 2000 Hunan Buddhist Charitable Foundation
Jiangsu 1981 2008 Jiangsu Buddhist Charity Movement to help
Pupils
Jiangxi 1986 2008 Donglin Charitable Foundation
Jilin 1981 ? Jilin Hunchun Buddhist Merit Society
Liaoning 1957 – –
Neimenggu 1957 – –
Ningxia 1988 – –
Qinghai 1981 – –
Shaanxi 1982 – –
Shandong 1988 ? Shandong Buddhist Net Charity Center
Shanghai 1954 – –
Shanxi 1957 2000 Shanxi Wutaishan Buddhist Charity
Merit Society
Sichuan 1957 – –
Tianjin 1954 2005 Tianjin Buddhist Charity Merit Foundation
Tibet 1956 – –
Xinjiang 1984 – –
Yunnan 1957 – –
Zhejiang 1980 – –
Sources: compilation by the author from provincial Buddhist associations’ reports, newspapers, and Buddhist
charities’ self-declaration.
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The variety of services offered by Buddhist philanthropy
Buddhist institutions have been active in the provision of services in education
despite the fact that there remain many restrictions on the help that they can
offer: their associations can only run colleges to train monks, or offer courses
within monasteries to train clerics, but they cannot operate schools that would
cater to the general public. 11 Despite these obstacles, however, there exist three
ways through which Buddhist institutions can provide support in education.
Philanthropic associations and temples can directly provide financial support,
in the forms of scholarships, to help the education of children with disabilities,
orphans, or children living in impoverished area. They can also organize fund-
raising activities to help Project Hope schools – a project originally supported
by the China Youth Development Foundation and the Communist Youth League
Committee. 12 Finally, Buddhist temples can provide money for scholarship or
school reconstruction through the revenue generated by ticket admissions and
devotees’ donations. The state needs not fear that Buddhist contributions to
education create problems to its legitimacy by granting too much face to Bud-
dhist philanthropic associations, however. As mentioned before, local media
ignore these efforts. Moreover, as a monk in Suzhou candidly admitted when
asked about the help his temple provides to schools, the funds that it donates is
managed by the local Bureau of Civil Affairs, and the temple has no say, even
less oversight, about the recipients of their generosity. 13 One consequence of
this practice is that the sponsorship of students does not display any feature of
its Buddhist origins. This was made clear to me during a visit to an orphanage
in Shijiazhuang prefecture that had received support from the Hebei Buddhist
charity. The teachers were not lay Buddhists, and there was no sign in the school
that made any reference to the religion. In that case, the provision of service in
education was a local affair. This has changed after the 2008 earthquake in
Sichuan. Buddhists associations all over China responded to demands by officials
from party and government to raise money for the rehabilitation of schools
destroyed by the earthquake. Most interviewees mentioned this event as an
example of what Buddhist charity can do. That is, they can respond and mobilize
resources to help people in need, as requested by the government, but they cannot
do more. In particular, they have to stay clear of controversies and in the case
of the 2008, they did not raise their voice to criticize the shortcomings of a
system that neglected to enforce proper standards for schools’ constructions.
11. Interviews with colleagues in Shanghai, June 2010.
12. For examples, colleagues in the department of philosophy at Suzhou University during
a meeting in June 2010 mentioned that the Hanshan Temple ( ) was able to generate an
annual income of about 100 million yuan from the sale of visiting tickets to the temple, and
used that money for charity activities, including 15 schools.
13. Interview in Xiyuan temple, July 2011.
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Moreover, as a perusal in the dozens of provincial and local publications that
Buddhist associations and temple issue many times a year shows, help to students
represents a marginal feature of their activities, barely mentioned in their publi-
cations. Cishan (Charity), an 8 pages quarterly distributed by the Nanputuo
Temple in Xiamen, represents a rare exception to that rule.
Buddhist philanthropic institutions also help the government in the delivery
of health care services, but their offering are modest, though not because they
are reluctant to do so. As seen above, the services offered by the Guangdong
Buddhist Clinic of Chinese Medicine are limited, with only two physicians and
two nurses. The same is true for the Nanputuo temple, which operates an equally
modest clinic. These experiments, as limited as they are, nevertheless inspire
people elsewhere: in Yangzhou, a monk residing in the Daming temple
expressed his hope that it could create a similar clinic in the city, also to offer
Chinese medicine. Besides the management of clinics, Buddhist institutions also
provide other forms of health care service. In Shanghai, the Yufo temple’s charity
has arranged for physicians to volunteer for the provision of counseling on health
related issues. 14 In Henan, the Shaolin Temple uses its well-known reputa-
tion as a tourist attraction to finance programs helping AIDS victims, and has
also established an orphanage in 2004 in conjunction with the Henan provincial
charity association. Some Buddhist associations have even developed plans to
build health care information centers, which have all the attribute of a hospital
but the name. 15 Over the years, many Chinese Buddhists have looked at the
achievements in health care of Buddhist associations such as the Tzu Chi
Foundation in Taiwan as an example they would like to follow, but aware of
the institutional obstacles standing in the way, they keep a low profile and do
not discuss that in their publication, less so in public. 16 The achievements of
Buddhists in health care could be considerable, as the long-term care offered
by the Taiwanese Buddhist charities has shown over the years. Many of my
interviewees, over the years, have spoken admiringly of this approach, but they
know that under the current legal context, it is unlikely to materialize.
Finally, Buddhist charities are also involved in aspects of social security in
which the state is hard pressed to provide, such as elderly care. This help extends
beyond mere financial support and some associations provide services in the
realm of companionship and psychological counseling. 17 Elderly care offers a
14. Interview with a lay volunteer working for a Buddhist charity in Shanghai, June 2009.
15. People interviewed on this issue are aware of the limitations imposed by regulations,
but as the discussion on transnational charities below will show, some are enthusiastically
planning to go this way.
16. During interviews with monks, nuns, and lay Buddhists in Hubei, Anhui, Hebei, and
Shanghai, all interlocutors praised the Taiwanese Tzu Chi Foundation as an example to emulate.
17. This kind of activity was described during interviews in Shanghai, June 2009, and
Hubei, May 2004.
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good example of the kind of social service provision that meets the concerns of
local governments. In the city of Suzhou, for example, the premise of a local
Buddhist temple serves as an elderly home. The clergy is assisted by lay personnel
ensuring that care is provided. A lay Buddhist in charge of the residents, whom
I have met in the temple itself, demonstrated a very thorough understanding of
the acute problems faced by China’s ageing society, and expressed his belief in
the necessity for the government to use the resources of Buddhism to provide
long-term care. However, the extent of the care his institutions and the Buddhists
in Suzhou could offer is rather modest. The Suzhou municipal Buddhist associa-
tion’s elderly home (anyangyuan ) serves around twenty people, a small
fraction of the elderly population in this city of more than six million people. 18
My interviewee noted that there are also more than 200 beds in Lingshan
temple and 40 beds in Hanshan Temple, both located in Suzhou. But consid-
ering the huge demands from the growing population of retirees, these resources
are insufficient. Although Buddhist institutions could offer a good environment
for retiree, the prevailing view that providing pension service is not the main
work of religions remains in force. The expansion of the Buddhist nursing home
for the elderly needs approval from the Bureau of Civil Affairs but the Suzhou
Buddhist association has not established a Buddhist Charity association to super-
vise the activities of the elderly home, in cooperation with the lay devotee associ-
ation, the local branch of the Buddhist studies institute, or even the Suzhou
branch of the Taiwan-based Tzu Chi Foundation. There is a lot of goodwill and
motivation from young and elderly lay Buddhists to provide social services to
the population, but in the absence of clear regulations, it is difficult to see how
it could go much further.
The overall contribution of Buddhist institutions to social welfare remains
very difficult to assess. Provincial Buddhist Associations’ annual reports are con-
sidered for “internal consumption’ only and access is restricted. As a monk acting
as Vice-Chair for a Buddhist Provincial Association explained, these reports con-
tain sensitive information that authorities would prefer not to release to the
public. Along accounts of philanthropic activities, they also contain information
on the participation to political campaigns against organizations the government
disapproves. 19 But even if such information was made available, it would be
difficult to obtain a precise assessment of Buddhist associations’ provision of
social services: many monks and novices met over the years have mentioned that
they do not keep a tight record of philanthropic activities, either because it is
too little, or simply because they do not have the time to devote to this activity.
This lack of record-keeping gives substance to the remarks of colleagues
in Shanghai who had noted that “most Buddhist philanthropic activities lack
18. “2009 ”. Suzhou Municipal Statistic Bureau. 2010-01-
20. http://www.dfzb.suzhou.gov.cn/zwgk/1691533.htm. Retrieved January 22, 2012
19. Interview in Nanjing, July 2011.
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professionalism.” 20 As one monk heading an important philanthropic association
in Fujian candidly admitted: “We are not social scientists and we have no time to
study this kind of activities.” 21 While a few associations do publish very detailed
account of their activities, most do not go beyond providing a list of donors in
their publication, and do not reveal details about those who benefit from their
fund-raising activities. The Nanputuo Charity offers very detailed monthly
reports for its activities, including revenues from different forms of fund raising
activities and the expenses incurred by its philanthropic activities. 22 Shaolin
temple has a program of adoption for orphans, with biographical details about
the children it has adopted. 23 Most other Buddhist charities’ reports, however,
limit themselves to publish the names of donors and the sum they have offered
in the meritorious names’ (gongde fangming ) pages of their publications.
Moreover, it is difficult to obtain a tally of Buddhist philanthropic activities
when many of the activities that monks and lay devotees consider “charity” are
not seen as such by non-Buddhists. For example, I have often met monks and
lay people who have included fangsheng (the release of animals) when they
were asked about the kind of philanthropy their temple or lay devotee associa-
tion manage. 24 Many of the interviewees I have met over the years have a very
inclusive definition of what they consider their temples’ or associations’ philan-
thropic activities and delivery of social services. They would consider the beauti-
fication of temples, for example, as a form of charity that could be supported
by fund-raising. When asked about the nature of his temple’s charitable activi-
ties, the abbot of the Daming temple in Yangzhou mentioned the planting of
trees on both sides of an affiliated library. 25 These comments, however, are not
disingenuous: the improvement of Buddhist temple contributes to a location’s
attractiveness to tourism, and therefore the local economy and the improvement
of its population’s welfare. The fund-raising for rebuilding temples and monas-
teries, or the financing of publications and the management of website, are also
defined as charity. But this definition of philanthropy, which is consistent with
Buddhist religious practice and ethos, does not always meet the definition of
charity as social service that official charity associations upheld. This is under-
standable, considering the uncertain regulatory context in which Buddhist asso-
ciations can perform activities other than purely religious ones, such as Dharma
lectures, sutra recitation, and meditation. The Merit societies which were dis-
cussed above and contribute to poverty alleviation, disaster relief, help to stu-
dents in need, elderly care and counselling are the exceptions rather than the rule.
20. Interview with two scholars in Shanghai, June 2010.
21. Interview in Xiamen, June 2010.
22. This is displayed in the quarterly Cishan, produced by Nanputuo.
23. The Shaolin Ciyouyuan has issued a brochure detailing its organization and
the beneficiaries of its services.
24. Interview in Yangzhou, July 2011.
25. Interview in Yangzhou, July 2011.
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Conclusion
The claim made in this article was a straightforward one: Chinese Buddhist
institutions are expanding dramatically, and this go beyond the rebuilding of
temples. The Chinese government, at all levels, encourages them to get involved
in charity and to assist in the delivery of a number of social services. This is a
new development because until recently religious institutions were forbidden to
do anything but perform liturgical activities within temples and other buildings
designated for that purpose. By doing such activities, Buddhist institutions can
gain respect and appreciation among non-Buddhists. However, there are no signs
so far that they could make political capital gain out of this endeavor.
In fact, the recovery of Buddhist institutions remains fragile. Government
support should not be taken for granted, and as the experience of Falungong
before has demonstrated too much attention on them could bring a halt to their
activities. Buddhist institutions are driven by a rational interest for the survival
of their institutions and because of this concern their leaders have never come
out publicly in favor of political reform, in contrast to Christians, who have been
vocal on issues of civil liberties. Perhaps some Buddhist leaders express such
concerns in private but if that is the case, there is no way to obtain confirmation
that they are.
Members of Buddhist philanthropic associations are convinced that they offer
the government a very valuable service. They are aware of the gaps in the differ-
ent dimensions of social policy, whether it is health care, education, or poverty
alleviation. The task ahead, however, is daunting. Some hope that Buddhist
institutions will be able to offer more comprehensive forms of healthcare services
in the future. Most Buddhist institutions do not have such plans because they
only started to redevelop their temples in the 1990s, and they feel that there is
too much work to be done. More important, perhaps, there is an absence of
consensus on where Buddhism should stand in the implementation of social
policy, and there are no sustained and systematic teachings on what should lay
Buddhists do. They can contribute to nurture high levels of civility, but they are
not on record for supporting a citizenry that could articulate constructive criti-
cisms of governmental policies’ shortcoming when they arise. In other words,
Buddhist institutions are not among the actors that put pressure on the Chinese
government to engage in political reforms that could overcome the sources of
growing social inequalities and poverty among vulnerable populations and, at
least in public, they express preference for stability and social harmony. 26
This article has opened with a question about the possibility that religious
diversity could affect positively democracy: assuming that the vitality of Bud-
dhism, along with the growth of Christianity, signifies that there is religious
26. The evidence for this attitude is routinely found in the editorials of the official publica-
tions of the Buddhist association of China, as well as those of local associations and temples.
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diversity in China, there are no visible effects on democratization that can be
inferred from that diversity. The growth of Buddhist institutions does favor the
expansion of civility by encouraging the growth of a more compassionate and
caring citizenry, but in doing so, it tends to strengthen the resilience of the current
regime rather than undermine it with demands for democratic opening: by
merely providing a safety valve to social tensions it dampens the forces for
political change.
André LALIBERTÉ
School of Political studies
University of Ottawa
Andre.laliberte@uottawa.ca
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Buddhist Charities and China’s Social Policy: An Opportunity for Alternate
Civility?
This paper explores the possibility that Chinese Buddhist institutions can represent
a source of alternate civility conducive to a more open political system. The paper
starts to explore the issue from a comparative perspective and considers three area
of contention between the state and religious authorities in which the latter can
advance the interests of society: education, health care, and relief. After a brief survey
of social policies and the role granted by the state to religious institutions as providers
of services in recent years, the essay considers the philanthropic activities of Buddhist
institutions. This survey looks at some of their achievements and their shortcomings,
and notes that they have adopted the same cautious attitude as their co-religionists
in Taiwan, which may nurture an alternate civility, but does not sustain necessarily
political reform.
Key words: Buddhism, China, religion and state, civility, social policy, charity.
Philanthropie bouddhiste et politiques sociales en Chine: la possibilité d’une
sociabilité nouvelle?
Les institutions bouddhistes chinoises représentent-elles une source de sociabilité
nouvelle pouvant favoriser une évolution vers un système politique plus ouvert ? On
peut y répondre dans une perspective comparée qui prend en compte trois domaines
d’intervention où des conflits peuvent émerger entre autorités étatiques et religieuses:
l’éducation, la santé, et l’aide publique. Après un survol des politiques sociales chi-
noises et du rôle minimal dévolu aux institutions religieuses dans leur mise en œuvre,
il est fait état des actions philanthropiques des institutions bouddhistes. Celles-ci ont
adopté la même prudence que leurs collègues taïwanaises: une attitude propice à la
civilité, certes, mais pas un encouragement à la réforme politique.
Mots-clés : bouddhisme, Chine, religion et État, sociabilité, politiques sociales,
philanthropie.
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Filantropia budista y politicas sociales en China: la posibilidad de nuevas
habilidades sociales?
Este artículo explora la posibilidad de que las instituciones budistas chinos pueden
ser una fuente de nuevas habilidades sociales que pueden promover un sistema polí-
tico más abierto. El artículo aborda esta cuestión desde una perspectiva comparativa
y considera tres áreas de intervención donde pueden surgir conflictos entre las autori-
dades estatales y religiosas en la que éste puede favorecer los intereses de la sociedad:
la educación, la salud y el apoyo del público. Después de un breve estudio de las
políticas sociales de China y el papel mínimo asignado a las instituciones religiosas
en su aplicación, el artículo considera que las instituciones filantrópicas budista. Este
estudio de los logros alcanzados por la constatación de que han adoptado la misma
actitud prudente que sus contrapartes en Taiwán: lo que puede favorezca la civilidad,
sin duda, pero no necesariamente sostener la reforma política.
Palabras clave: budismo, China, la religión y el Estado, la civilidad, política social,
filantropia.

